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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

RECENT CASES
BAN-Ks AND BANEiNG-RIGHTS OF DEPOSITING CUSTOmS."When a bank gives one of its depositors credit by a check
drawn in favor of that depositor by another depositor on the
same institution, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the act of
crediting to the depositing customer will be given the same effect as if actual cash had been paid to him; and if thereafter,
even though it be on the same day, the bank officials ascertain
they have made a mistake, and the drawer did not in fact have
the money on deposit to meet the check, it will not affect the
rights of the depositing customer, for it is a completed transaction, as niuch so as if the actual money in cash had been paid to
the customer over the counter."
The necessities of commerce require that there shall be
the utmost good faith between the banking institution and its
customers, and when one customer of a bank presents to it a
check drawn on it by another customer, and is given credit by
that amount on the books of the institution, or is given what
amounts to a certificate of deposit for that amount, the transaction is closed and the depositing customer has a right to rely
upon the fact that he has that amount of money on deposit in
that institution; and if there is any question of loss between the
customer and the bank, the latter must bear that loss because
it brought about the loss by its own mistake or oversight.
This decision is in keeping with the holding of other cases:
Wasson v. Lamb, 120 Ind. 514, "The settled rule is, where
cheeks, drafts or other evidences of debt are received in good
faith as deposits, if the bank credits them as so much money, the
title to the checks or drafts is immediately transferred to the
bank, and it becomes legally liable to the depositor as for so
much money deposited." Robinson & Go., et al. v. Bank of
Pikeville, et al., 146 Ky. 538, "When a bank receives, not for
collection, but as so much money, a check ahd places the amount
to the credit of a customer, it thereby assumes liability for this
amount to all-persons to whom the customer may giv -checks."
First National Bank v. Mammoth Blue Gem Coal Co., April 28,
1922, 194 Ky. 580.
S.B.N.
ROAD BONDS--RoADS MAY BE ALTERmD BY FISCAL
MONEY DONATED TO STATE HIGHWAY CommiSsION.-At

COURT--

an elec-
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tion on road bonds, it was voted that certain inter-county seat
roads be built and a commission appointed before the election
by the fiscal court, ordered the road built along a certain route.
The money obtained from the sale of the bonds was paid to the
State Highway Commission specifying the purpose of the bonds.
Held, an order designating the particular road along which a
highway is to be built, can be waived by the fiscal court unless
specific roads are identified beyond question. The promise to
use funds for certain roads is complied with by donating the
funds to the State Highway Commission, having designated the
roads to be improved.
When prior to an election, the proper authorities entered
of record the specified and named roads, upon which the proceeds of the bonds would be expended and the people voted the
indebtedness with this understanding, neither the fiscal court
nor any other authority having jurisdiction over the subject
matter could divest the funds. Scott v. Forest, County Judge,
174 Ky. 672, 192 S. W. 691; Campbell v. Clinton County, 176
Ky.- 396, 195 S. W. 787. That such bonds are valid. Lawrence
County v. Lawrence Fiscal Court, 191 Ky. 45, 229 S. W. 139.
Such roads, however, must be specifically designated; otherwise, where an order is thus made, the fiscal court or other authorities may exercie their discretion and the doctrine that
orders made beforehand must be strictly complied with creates
a restraint upon the powers and duties of the fiscal court and
other public road authorities. The case must be construed then
to mean that an inter-county seat road will be built and -a part
of the proceeds of the bond issue will be donated for that purpose. Wilson v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell County, 240 S. W.
(Ky.) 743.
J.B.C.
LIQUORS-EviDENCE oF RAviNG SAME FOR SAE.-The defendant called at an express office for packages containing
liquor and paid the charges and then went with the express
agent to the warehouse to get the packages, but before the express agent had identified them or pointed them out, or indicated that they were at the defendant's disposal, the police officers arrested the defendant and themselves took possession of
the packages.
This action, was brought against the defendant for violating section 2554a-1 of the Kentucky Statutes, which made it
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unlawful to keep liquors for sale except for sacramental purposes, etc.
The court held that the defendant never had the possession, but that the possession passed from the express agent to
the officers. It was construed that the words "to keep" mean
to have in possession. The defendant could not be convicted for
keeping liquors for sale because he did not have possession himself or through an agent. Young v. Commonwealth, April 25,
1922, 194 Ky. 561.
J.B.N.
ARSON-TRAiLiNG Or BLOODHOUNDS-SUFFICIENCY

OF EVI-

DENE.-Three persons were jointly indicted by the grand jury
of Bracken County, in which they were charged with the offense
of feloniously setting fire to and burning the barn of their
neighbor. Bloodhounds were obtained immediately after the
fire.: The dogs trailed from the place of the burned barn to the
place where the accused were and took particular notice of these
three persons but would not notice any other members of the
family.
One of the chief questions for determination was the proper
effect to be given the trailing of bloodhounds, when the evidence is admissible at all in criminal prosecutions. It was
found, after the examination of numerous authorities, such as
follow: Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 41, 44 S. W. 143, 42
L. R. A. 432; Blair v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 218, 204 S. W.
67; State v. Adams, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 870; Ruse v. State, L.
R. A. 1917E 726, that with the exception of Indiana and Illhnois the trailing of bloodhounds, under certain conditions, is
competent evidence, but all the courts agree that before it may
be introduced for any purpose, it must ,beshown that the dogs
"have been trained to follow human beings by their tracks and
to have been tested as to its (or their) accuracy in trailing upon
one or more occasions."
The next question was the effect to be given to the testimony
after it is received. It was held, after examining the authorities cited above, "that proof of trailing by bloodhounds standing alone is not sufficient to authorize a conviction; for, hfter
all, the trailing of the dogs is in the nature of expert testimony,
which when given by trained educated persons, is regarded with
more or less disfavor and classed as among the weakest character of testimony."
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Prom the authorities cited in this case, it seems that the
trailing of bloodhounds, when admitted as evidence, may be
used to corroborate other evidence, which, when taken together,
may conne3t the accused with the crime and lead to a legal conviction. Therefore, the general rule seems to be that when evidence of trailing bloodhounds is admitted, it must be supported
by substantial evidence, before a conviction is justifiable. Myers
v. Commonwealtht, April 21, 1922, 194 Ky. 523, 240 .S. W. 71.
0. W. C.
HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS-JXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO Snow INTENTION.-A testator, by holographic will, devised all his property
to his nephew. The brothers and sisters of the testator contested the will on the ground of forgery. After proving the
handwriting of the testator, the contestee was permitted to show
that the testator stated before making his will that he intended
leaving his property to the contestee, and that he stated after
the date of the will that he had made a will making the contestee his sole devisee. Held, in the contest of a will on the
sole ground of forgery, both the ante-testamentary declarations
of the testator that he intended to make a will leaving his property to the contestee, and his post-testamentary statements that
he had made such a will are admissible in corroboration of other
and more direct evidence tending to show the genuineness of the
C. H. L.
will. Athertrn, et al. v. Gaslin, et al., 194 Ky. 460.
ADVERSE

POSSESSION-ENTRY

op JoINT

TENANTS.-David

Hogan owned certain land in Lee County, and in payment of
a debt he conveyed the land to H. C. Needham & Co., Hogg &
Bro., and E. M. Pryse & Bro., making them joint tenants.
Later a suit for partition was brought and a sale of the land
ordered. At the sale J. M. Sebastain bid the property in; Hogg
& Bro. and Pryse & Bro. paid him their part.
In 1885, H. C. Needham conveyed his interest to D. B.
Pields, who was the husband of the appellant (defendant in the
court below) under whom she now claims. The whole of the
land has been in the continuous and undisturbed possession of
D. B. Fields and after his death in that of the appellant, in all
for a period of over twenty years.
Appellees (plaintiffs in the court below) claim the interest
of Hogg & Bro. and Pryse & Bro., and contend that they are
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joint tenants with appellant, and therefore appellant acquired
no title by adverse possession. They sought and obtained a decree for the sale of the land, and a division of the proceeds
among the respective interests as alleged. This appeal is prosecuted to reverse that judgment.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment appealed
from, and the judge delivering the opinion of the court said:
"We cannot concur in the view that the occupancy of Fields
and the appellees was that of joint tenants, in which event it is
contended that appellants could not acquire title by adverse
possession. Ordinarily the entry of one joint tenant upon land
inures to the benefit of the others and his possession is not adverse to the rights of the others, but it has been repeatedly held
by this court that the possession may be so hostile and adverse
to the others as to invest the claimant with title by prescription. ")
In this case the court follows very closely the doctrine as
laid down in some earlier cases: Gossom v. Danadlson, 18 B.
Mlonroe 238; Culver v. Culver's Admr., 25 Ky. L. R. 296; that
one co-tenant might obtain title -by prescription provided the
holding was very hostile and adverse. But there is another
feature yet. When Sebastain sold his interest to Fields the joint
tenancy ended and any possession of the whole of the property
would be adverse to the other joint tenants. Larman v. Huey's
Heirs, 52 Ky. 436; Pope v. Brassfield, 110 Ky. 128.
The particular point of this case, i. e., adverse possession
by joint tenant, seems to be rather unique. The decisions of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals are about the only ones to be
found on this point. Smith, et al. v. Hogg, et al., April 21, 1922,
195 Ky. 265.
E.S.
OWNERSHIP OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-PROVINCE

OF

COURT

AND JuRy.-The trustee in bankruptcy of the husband brought

an action against the husband and wife for the possession of an
automobile. The wife claimed the ownership of the automobile
by purchase from the husband soon after he had bought it and
previous to the bankruptcy proceedings. The evidence was conflicting, and the court submitted to the jury the question of
ownership.
. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the lower court erred in submitting the
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question of ownership to the jury. Ownership being a mixed
question of law and fact, the trial court should have stated to
the jury what constituted ownership and permitted the jury
merely to pass on the existence of such facts.
While there are no Kentucky cases bearing directly on this
point, it has been very generally held to be erroneous for the
court to submit a mixed question of law and fact to the jury,
unless under proper instructions from the court. Porter v.
Blood, 22 Mass. (5 Pick) 54, in all cases involving a mixed question -of law and fact, the facts are to be submitted to the jury,
with proper instructions as to the law. Electric lehicle Go. v.
Price, 138 Ill. App. 594, .an instruction should not submit to the
jury the determination of questions of mixed law and fact.
Osborn et ux. v. Tomasson, April 18, 1922, 194 Ky. 499, 239
S. W. 774.
J.G.B.
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